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Essentials of Strategic Intelligence. By Loch K. Johnson, 
Editor. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 
2015. ISBN: 978-1-4408-3227-7. Index. Notes. Appendix. 
Glossary. Pp. xx, 498. $63.00 
 
Readers familiar with Praeger’s 2007 gathering of essays in five-volumes 
entitled Strategic Intelligence will welcome this updated and more compact 
collection of key articles from that original anthology.  Capably edited by Loch 
K. Johnson, who also introduces readers to the current state of the literature 
on intelligence in the book’s opening piece, the work consists of twenty-one 
articles written by a combination of academics, practitioners, and other 
experts.  It is divided into five topical parts: Understanding the Hidden Side 
of Government, The Intelligence Cycle, Covert Action, Counterintelligence, 
and Intelligence and Accountability. 
 
The three articles that comprise the section on “Understanding the Hidden 
Side of Government” start with the aforementioned bibliographic essay 
written by the editor.  Another article examines the methodologies used to 
conduct research in the intelligence field, but the most interesting piece is 
Amy B. Zegart’s look at why scholars have not yet fully accepted the study of 
intelligence as an academic discipline.  She decries the neglect of scholars as 
antithetical to the historical role played by academics in “developing new 
organizations and new ideas for U.S. national security” (p. 44).  Citing as 
examples of scholarly assistance to the Intelligence Community (IC) the use of 
academics as early CIA analysts and the contributions of game theory to 
providing insights into nuclear deterrence, she then concludes that the 
combined factors of secrecy and the restraints of current theories and 
methodologies are what are responsible for keeping professors at bay.  It is a 
conundrum that does not appear to bode well for the future of the discipline 
nor the IC. 
 
Since the intelligence failures of 9/11 and the flawed application of various 
forms of intelligence data that was used to justify the Iraq War, there has been 
an increasing sense of tension between politicians and intelligence 
professionals.  Jack Davis’s essay in the second part of the book addressing 
“The Intelligence Cycle,” examines some of the existing ground rules 
governing the relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers.  
He suggests some guidelines to support analysts’ independence and to avoid a 
“deliberate and unintentional politicization of analysis” (p. 131) while at the 
same time cautioning policy makers on possible subversion of analysis for 
political purposes.  In regard to the former, he posits that the President’s 
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Intelligence Advisory Board is well positioned to oversee analyst compliance, 
while the role of the Ombudsman for Politicization should be strengthened to 
provide oversight of both the IC and policymakers.  It is a suggestion well 
worth consideration. 
 
The National Security Act of 1947 is generally considered to have vaguely 
provided the rationale for the conduct of covert action in support of U.S. 
foreign policy goals.  Lying somewhere along a continuum of responses 
ranging from diplomatic to military force, the so-called ‘third option’ has been 
used to pursue a variety of operational goals from political, economic, or 
propaganda, to direct paramilitary actions.  Since 9/11, covert action has been 
a burgeoning business.  In the book’s third section that addresses that topic, 
Jennifer Kibbe’s essay on “Covert Action and the Pentagon” raises some 
interesting questions about the rapidly expanding capabilities and missions of 
military special operations forces (SOF).  Though it was traditionally the 
realm of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Kibbe asserts that SOF has 
increasingly engaged in operational activities that fall within the realm of 
covert action, which is designed to conceal the identity of the sponsor, as 
opposed to merely clandestine activities, which are designed only to maintain 
tactical secrecy.  Kibbe explores the implications of liberal legal 
interpretations of the boundaries of the Intelligence Authorization Act and 
questions whether there is sufficiently robust congressional oversight.  She 
concludes with a brief look at the struggles to transition the drone mission 
from CIA hands to those of the military’s Joint Special Operations Command, 
citing it as a case study of the various oversight issues that accompany the 
involvement of the Department of Defense in covert operations.  Kibbe calls 
for clearly needed updates to address the unforeseen changes that have 
occurred since the creation of laws and policies governing the roles of various 
agencies in covert activities. 
 
The fourth section of the book is entitled “Counterintelligence,” (CI) but it 
necessarily addresses the issue of counterterrorism (CT) as well.  Though 
counterespionage (CE) is acknowledged by the editor as an offensive means of 
CI, it is a subject that is inadequately treated in any of the essays in this 
section in other than an historical sense.  It is an element of CI worth looking 
at more closely.  Our intelligence capabilities must be directed at more than 
just the efforts to fight terrorism and preserve the safety of the homeland.  
The vulnerabilities of our information technology to cyber attack is illustrative 
of the hazards of failing to devote sufficient effort to countering those new 
cyber threats as well as addressing more traditional espionage threats.  The 
Great Game goes on whether scholars find it relevant or not, but the topic of 
intelligence and terrorism is admittedly a pressing issue. 
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In “The Intelligence War against Global Terrorism,” Richard Russell explores 
how the CIA has fared in its role of conducing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
operations, performing analysis that informs decision makers, and carrying 
out covert actions.  Sadly, this is one article that could have benefitted greatly 
from an updated evaluation of that performance since 2007, yet the notes 
reveal only two newer sources, both of which refer readers directly to the 
sources for more information on waterboarding or paramilitary activities.  
Russell cites evidence that is critical of the CIAs efforts in all the areas he 
discusses, and his findings were clearly valid when the article was written, but 
we are left to wonder whether the analysis of more current evidence would 
alter the conclusions. 
 
The final segment of the book entitled “Intelligence and Accountability,” 
begins with Davit Barrett’s study tracing the history of congressional 
oversight through 1963.  It follows with Glenn Hastedt’s discussion of four 
different but interrelated political patterns that influence intelligence 
policymaking and which must be acknowledged if we are to gain a full 
understanding of the policy process.  Hastedt’s piece, along with the 
subsequent work by Matthew Aid on the National Security Agency, both delve 
into post-Snowden concerns at that agency.  Hastedt discusses the results of 
the inquiry into the agency’s electronic surveillance activities and President 
Obama’s reform agenda, but he is critical of what was left unsaid in that 
agenda, noting the President’s promise only to end the activity “as it currently 
exists” (p. 412).  Matthew Aid provides a broader consideration of the future 
of the agency, citing a number of factors that could potentially influence its 
mission.  
 
Mark Phythian’s article on “The British Experience with Intelligence 
Accountability” rounds out the book.  He traces the historical rise of 
accountability starting in the 1970s and focuses largely on the Intelligence 
Security Committee (ISC) in Britain, including an interesting discussion of the 
role of British intelligence in the period leading up the Iraq War and how the 
results of the ISC’s investigation damaged its credibility.  He ends by touching 
on the impact of the Snowden case and cites it as a potential “catalyst in 
speeding up the next stage in what history will record as a slow march toward 
an appropriately powerful system of legislative oversight of intelligence” (p. 
468). 
 
A glossary of terms used in the book and an appendix showing the 2014 
structure of the IC in the United States round out the work.  As with most 
collections of essays, readers will find something of interest in the book.  A 
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few of them have stood the test of time well, others have been substantially 
updated to incorporate new research or information, and a few would have 
been made even more relevant and current with the addition of more new 
material.  As a textbook it would be a useful primer on strategic intelligence 
issues and, if not always the most current material, it would at least open the 
door for discussion of the major topics and perhaps steer students to avenues 
of research on their own. 
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